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THE POSSE COMITATUS ACT: A PRINCIPLE IN
NEED OF RENEWAL
I. INTRODUCTION
In response to the military presence in the Southern States during the
Reconstruction Era, Congress passed the Posse Comitatus Act' ("PCA" or the
"Act") to prohibit the use of the Army in civilian law enforcement. The Act
embodies the traditional American principle of separating civilian and
military authority and currently forbids the use of the Army and Air Force to
enforce civilian laws.2 In the last fifteen years, Congress has deliberately
eroded this principle by involving the military in drug interdiction at our
borders This erosion will continue unless Congress renews the PCA's
principle to preserve the necessary and traditional separation of civilian and
military authority.
The need for reaffirmation of the PCA's principle is increasing because in
recent years, Congress and the public have seen the military as a panacea for
domestic problems.4 Within one week of the bombing of the federal building
in Oklahoma City,' President Clinton proposed an exception to the PCA to
allow the military to aid civilian authorities in investigations involving
"weapons of mass destruction. ' In addition to this proposal Congress also
1. Army Appropriations Act, ch. 263, § 15, 20 Stat. 145, 152 (1878) (codified as amended at 18
U.S.C. § 1385 (1994)).
2. See 18 U.S.C. § 1385 (1994).
3. See generally Jim McGee, Military Seeks Balance in Delicate Mission: The Drug War,
WASH. PosT, Nov. 29, 1996, at Al. The military has become "embedded" in the drug war and
performing domestic police missions traditionally belonging to civilian law enforcement. Id.
4. Charles J. Dunlap, Jr., Welcome to the Junta: The Erosion of Civilian Control of the U.S.
Military, 29 WAKE FOREST L. REv. 341, 342 (1994); see also McGee, supra note 3; Editorial, A Hasty
Response to Terrorism, N.Y. TIMES, June 9, 1995, at A28.
5. On April 19, 1995, a fertilizer bomb in a parked truck destroyed the federal office building in
Oklahoma City, Oklahoma. David Johnston, Terror in Oklahoma City: The Investigation, at Least 31
Are Dead, Scores Are Missing After Car Bomb Attack in Oklahoma City Wrecks 9-Story Federal
Office Building, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 20, 1995, at Al, B8. At least 165 people were killed. See Terror in
Oklahoma: The Victims; 165 People Who Were Killed in the Oklahoma City Explosion, N.Y. TIMES,
May 7, 1995, at 36 (list of those killed).
6. Todd S. Purdum, Terror in Oklahoma: The Overview, Clinton Seeks More Anti-Terrorism
Measures, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 27, 1995, at Al, A21. "Weapons of mass destruction ... are generally
considered to be nuclear or massive chemical or biological weapons." Id The exception to the PCA
would have been enacted in the Counterterrorism Act of 1995, S. 735, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. § 908
(June 5, 1995) (version 4) (the House version was H.R. 1710).
The House of Representatives later deleted this provision from their version of the bill to gain
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considered legislation to directly involve federal troops in enforcing customs
and immigration laws at the border.7 In the 1996 presidential campaign,
candidate Bob Dole pledged to increase the role of the military in the drug
war, and candidate Lamar Alexander even proposed replacing the
Immigration and Naturalization Service and the Border Patrol with a new
branch of the armed forces.'
The growing haste and ease with which the military is considered a
panacea for domestic problems will quickly undermine the PCA if it remains
unchecked. Minor exceptions to the PCA can quickly expand to become
major exceptions. For example in 1981, Congress created an exception to the
PCA to allow military involvement in drug interdiction at our borders.9 Then
in 1989, Congress designated the Department of Defense as the "single lead
agency" in drug interdiction efforts.'
The PCA criminalizes, effectively prohibiting, the use of the Army or the
Air Force as a posse comitatus" to execute the laws of the United States. It
support from conservative Republicans and salvage the legislation. Terrorism Bill Plan May Break
Deadlock, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 2, 1995, at 8. An exception for nuclear materials is already law. See 18
U.S.C. § 831 (1994) (authorizing the Attorney General to request assistance from the Department of
Defense in enforcing prohibitions against transactions involving nuclear materials).
7. See Border Integrity Act of 1995, H.R. 1224, 104th Cong., 1st Sess.
8. See Otto Kreisher, Alexander's Ideas Hard to Pin Down; Military, Welfare Experts Call
Plans Lousy, Unworkable, SAN DIEGO UNION-TRIB., Mar. 1, 1996, at A6, available in 1996 WL
2145186.
9. See Department of Defense Authorization Act, 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-86, § 905, 95 Stat. 1099,
1114-16 (1981) (codified as amended at 10 U.S.C. § 371-380 (1994)).
10. National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Years 1990 and 1991, Pub. L. No. 100-189, §
1202, 103 Stat. 1353, 1563 (1989) (codified as amended at 10 U.S.C. § 124(a) (1994)). The statute
states as follows:
Lead Agency.-
(1) The Department of Defense shall serve as the single lead agency of the Federal
Government for the detection and monitoring of aerial and maritime transit of illegal drugs into the
United States.
(2) The responsibility conferred by paragraph (1) shall be carried out in support of the counter-
drug activities of Federal, State, local, and foreign law enforcement agencies.
10 U.S.C. § 124(a) (1994); see also McGee, supra note 3, at Al (since 1989, the military has spent
over seven billion dollars on counter-drug efforts).
11. Posse comitatus is defined as follows: "The power or force of the county. The entire
population of a county above the age of fifteen, which a sheriff may summon to his assistance in
certain cases, as to aid him in keeping the peace, in pursuing and arresting felons, etc." BLACK'S LAW
DICTIONARY 1162 (6th ed. 1990). The definition is your basic movie western posse. In 1854, the
Attorney General interpreted posse comitatus to include the military. See infra notes 44-45 and
accompanying text.
In Norman England, the posse comitatus also had a military character and could be called out to
defend the kingdom against insurrection and invasion. Walter E. Lorence, The Constitutionality of the
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reads:
Whoever, except in cases and under circumstances expressly
authorized by the Constitution or Act of Congress, willfully uses any
part of the Army or Air Force as a posse comitatus or otherwise to
execute the laws shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not more
than two years, or both.'2
Though a criminal law, the PCA has a more important role as a statement of
policy that embodies "the traditional Anglo-American principle of separation
of military and civilian spheres of authority, one of the fundamental precepts
of our form of government."' 3
Major and minor exceptions to the PCA, which allow the use of the
military in law enforcement roles, blur the line between military and civilian
roles, undermine civilian control of the military, damage military readiness,
and inefficiently solve the problems that they supposedly address.'4
Additionally, increasing the role of the military would strengthen the federal
law enforcement apparatus that is currently under close scrutiny for
overreaching its authority. 5 Although it seems benign, such an increase in
military authority revives fears of past overreaching during the late 1960s.1
6
This Note argues that the principle embodied by the PCA should be
renewed by rejecting exceptions to the Act and reaffirming the policy behind
its inception. This renewal is necessary to preserve the historic division
between civilian and military roles, to maintain civilian superiority over the
military, to enhance military readiness, and to efficiently attack domestic
Posse Comitatus Act, 8 U. KAN. CITY L. REV. 164, 166-67 (1939-40).
12. 18 U.S.C. § 1385 (1994). Currently, the fine for individuals is up to $250,000. See 18 U.S.C.
§ 3571(b) (1994).
13. Posse Comitatus Act: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Crime of the Comm. on the Judiciary
on H.R. 3519, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. 10-11 (1981) [hereinafter PCA Hearing] (statement of Edward
S.G. Dennis, Jr., Chief, Narcotics and Dangerous Drug Sec., Crim. Div., U.S. Dep't of Justice).
14. See infra Part IV.
15. See, e.g., Stephen Labaton, Bill on Terrorism, Once a Certainty, Derails in House, N.Y.
TIMES, Oct. 3, 1995, at Al; The F.B.I. Overreaches, N.Y. TIMES, May 10, 1995, at A22; see also
James Bennett, Two States, Two Gatherings and a Lot of Anti-Government Sentiment, N.Y. TIMES,
Oct. 3, 1995, atAl.
16. See Laird v. Tatum, 408 U.S. 1, 3-8 (1972) (discussing the Army's domestic surveillance
system in the late 1960s). The plaintiffs sued to stop the Army from compiling files on civilians as part
of its support of federal law enforcement. Id. at 2. The Supreme Court dismissed the lawsuit for lack of
standing. Id. at 12-15; see also Letter from former Senator Sam J. Ervin, Jr. to Rep. William J. Hughes,
Chairman, Subcomm. on Crime, Comm. on the Judiciary, House of Representatives (June 2, 1981)
[hereinafter Ervin Letter] (Sen. Ervin chaired the committee that investigated the military's spying on
civilians in 1967 and 1968), in PCA Hearing, supra note 13, at 86.
1997]
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problems. Part II reviews the historical traditional American fear of a standing
army and the circumstances leading to the PCA's passage. Part III discusses
the current scope of the PCA and the permissible roles of the military. Part IV
explains how exceptions to the PCA endanger its underlying principle. The
explanation covers the spectrum of possible exceptions to the PCA: drug
interdiction, border duty, and biological and chemical weapons
investigations. 7 Part V proposes legislative action to reaffirm the policy of
the PCA and to limit to any further exceptions to it.
II. PASSAGE OF THE PCA: REAFFIRMATION OF A LONG-STANDING
AMERICAN TRADITION
The hotly contested presidential election of 1876 directly led to the
passage of the PCA, 8 but the principle behind the Act-excluding the
military from the civilian sphere-is as old as the United States. 9 Since the
writing of the Declaration of Independence, Americans have mistrusted
standing armies and have seen them as instruments of oppression and
tyranny.20 Over time, the military has increased its esteem among the
17. Border duty is a direct use of the military to execute civilian laws. Use of the military for
investigative support is on the opposite end of the spectrum-a passive, indirect execution of civilian
laws with only minor involvement foreseen. Drug interdiction falls between the two: it is passive, but
the involvement is extensive. In 1993, the Department of Defense had $1.4 billion in its annual budget
to finance drug interdiction. Charles . Dunlap, Jr., The Last American Warrior: Non-Traditional
Missions and the Decline of the U.S. Armed Forces, FLETCHER F. WORLD AFF., Winter/Spring 1994,
at 65, 69. For a description of current activities of the military in counter-drug activities, see McGee,
supra note 3.
18. See infra note 49-51 and accompanying text.
19. See supra note 13 and infra notes 20-43 and accompanying text. "[M]emories of the
arrogance of the British Army" fueled the early controversy over the military. M.E. Bowman, The
Military Role in Meeting the Threat ofDomestic Terrorism, 39 NAVAL L. REV. 209, 211 (1990).
20. The Declaration of Independence eloquently expressed this mistrust:
He has erected a multitude of New Offices, and sent hither swarms of Officers, to harass our
People, and eat out their substance.
He has kept among us, in times of peace, Standing Armies without the Consent of our
Legislature.
He has affected to render the Military independent of and superior to the Civil Power.
He has combined with others to subject us to a jurisdiction foreign to our constitution, and
unacknowledged by our laws; giving his Assent to their acts of pretended Legislation:
For quartering large bodies of armed troops among us:
For protecting them, by a mock Trial, from Punishment for any Murders which they should
commit on the Inhabitants of these States:
He has abdicated Government here, by declaring us out of his Protection and waging War
against us.
[VOL. 75:953
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol75/iss2/11
1997] THE POSSE COMITATUS ACT
populace, but it has always been held separate from civilian government and
limited to its focussed goal of military preparedness and national security.
This antimilitarism bent of the United States is evident in our foundation
documents.22 The Declaration of Independence decries King George IlI's use
of armies "to compleat works of death, desolation and tyranny ... totally
unworthy ... of a civilized nation."'  Specifically, the Signers of the
Declaration of Independence attacked the keeping of a standing army in time
of peace,24 the military's independence from the civil control,' and the
quartering of troops among the population of the colonies.26
In response to these concerns, the Articles of Confederation limited the
role of the military.27 Specifically, they restricted the raising of armies and the
maintaining of naval vessels.2" They also reserved the appointment of
He has plundered our seas, ravaged our Coasts, burnt our towns, and destroyed the lives of our
people.
He is at this time transporting large armies of foreign mercenaries to compleat the works of
death, desolation and tyranny, already begun with circumstances of Cruelty & perfidy scarcely
paralleled in the most barbarous ages, and totally unworthy the Head of a civilized nation.
He has constrained our fellow Citizens taken Captive on the high Seas to bear Arms against
their Country, to become the executioners of their friends and Brethren, or to fall themselves by
their Hands.
THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE paras. 12-19 (U.S. 1776).
21. See PCA Heating, supra note 13, at 15 (statement of William Howard Taft IV, Gen. Counsel,
U.S. Dep't of Defense); ANDREW J. GOODPASTER & SAMUEL P. HUNTINGTON, CIVIL-MILITARY
RELATIONS 9-11 (1977); cf Letter from Larry L. Simms, Deputy AssL Att'y Gen., Office of Legal
Counsel, U.S. Dep't of Justice, to Rep. L.A. "Skip" Befalis 4-5 (Aug. 6, 1979) (noting that because
"the primary mission of the Navy is to be the instrument of seapower in the national defense," it should
not become involved in interdiction efforts despite the lack of a PCA bar to such involvement),
reprinted in PCA Hearing, supra note 13, at 523, 526-27.
22. See generally U.S. CONST.; ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION, 1 Stat. 4 (U.S. 1778) (superseded
by U.S. CONST.); THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE (U.S. 1776).
23. THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 15 (U.S. 1776).
24. Id. para. 13 ("He has kept among us, in times of peace, Standing Armies without the Consent
of our Legislature.").
25. Id. para. 14 ("He has affected to render the Military independent of and superior to the Civil
Power.").
26. Id. para. 15 ("For quartering large bodies of armed troops among us: For protecting them, by
mock Trial, from Punishment for any Murders which they sould commit....").
27. ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION arts. 6, §§ 4,5, 1 Stat. 4,4-5 (U.S. 1778); id. art. 7, 1 Stat. at 5.
28. Id. art. 6, §§ 4-5, 1 Stat. at4-5.
No vessels of war shall be kept up in time of peace by any State, except such number only, as
shall be deemed necessary by the United States in Congress assembled, for the defence of such
State, or its trade; nor shall any body of forces be kept up by any State, in time of peace, except
such number only, as in the judgment of the United States, in Congress assembled, shall be deemed
requisite to garrison the forts necessary for the defence of such State; but every State shall always
keep up a well regulated and disciplined militia, sufficiently armed and accoutered, and shall
provide and constantly have ready for use, in public stores, a due number of field pieces and tents,
Washington University Open Scholarship
958 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW QUARTERLY [VOL. 75:953
officers, other than the rank of general, to the states, thus lessening the central
government's control over the military.29 In addition to establishing a weak
central government, the Articles of Confederation's reliance upon militia for
military power was inadequate to meet the needs of the nation.3"
In the Constitution, the Founding Fathers mandated civilian control of the
military through the government structure.3 While allowing for a standing
army and the maintenance of a navy,32 the Constitution restricts military
appropriations to two years;33 designates the President as the Commander-in-
Chief, thereby subordinating the military to civilian authority;34 and
empowers Congress to regulate the armed forces.35 Additionally, the Bill of
Rights proscribes the peacetime quartering of soldiers in private homes36 and
and a proper quantity of arms, ammunition and camp equipage.
No State shall engage in any war without the consent of the United States in Congress
assembled, unless such State be actually invaded by enemies ... : nor shall any State grant
commissions to any ships or vessels of war, nor letters of marque or reprisal .... unless such State
be infested by pirates, in which case vessels of war may be fitted out for that occasion, and kept so
long as the danger shall continue, or until the United States in Congress assembled shall determine
otherwise.
li
29. Id. art. 7, 1 Stat. at 5.
When land-forces are raised by any State for the common defence, all officers of or under the
rank of colonel, shall be appointed by the Legislature of each State respectively by whom such
forces shall be raised, or in such manner as such State shall direct, and all vacancies shall be filled
up by the State which first made the appointment.
Id.
30. John A. Hardaway, Colonial and Revolutionary War Origins of American Military Policy,
MIL. REV., Mar. 1976, at 77, 81.
31. J. Bryan Echols, Open Houses Revisited: An Alternative Approach, 129 MIL. L. REv. 185,
200 (1990).
32. U.S. CONST. art 1, § 8, cls. 12-13.
33. Id. art. 1, § 8, cl. 12 ("The Congress shall have Power ... To raise and support Armies, but
no Appropriation of Money to that Use shall be for a longer Term than two Years ...."). However,
appropriations for the Navy are not similarly limited. See id. cl. 13 ("To provide and maintain a Navy
.... "). The failure to limit navy appropriations follows from the failure to mention the navy as an evil
in the Declaration of Independence. See supra note 20. Indeed, navies were seen as instruments of the
great powers and were not thought to be a threat to civil supremacy.
34. U.S. CONST. art. 2, § 2 ('The President shall be Commander in Chief of the Army and Navy
of the United States, and of the Militia of the several States, when called into the actual Service of the
United States....').
35. Id. art. I, § 8, cl. 14 ("To make Rules for the Government and Regulation of the land and
naval forces.'). The Constitution preserves the right of states to appoint officers for their militias, but
limits the states' authority by requiring militia training to conform with Congress's requirements. Id.
cl. 16; cf THE ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION art. 7 (U.S. 1778) (as discussed supra notes 27-30 and
accompanying text).
36. U.S. CONST. amend. I ("No Soldier shall, in time of peace be quartered in any house,
without the consent of the Owner, nor in time of war, but in a manner to be prescribed by law."). For a
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol75/iss2/11
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provides for the states to have a well-regulated militia as a counterbalance to a
national army."
Fear of a standing army helped to motivate the enactment of the Bill of
Rights beyond the specific amendments relating to the military.3" By
guaranteeing individual rights in the First Amendmente 9 and freedom from
unreasonable search and seizure in the Fourth Amendment, it was that the
abuses of the British army could be prevented in the new republic.4 ' The
Founding Fathers recognized that the military's authoritarian nature, while
effective in defending democracy, remains antithetical to the basic tenets of
democracy.42 According to this reasoning, "[s]kepticism and criticism" of the
military are "absolute requisites of freedom" that are missing from every
unfree nation.43
Fear of the military seemed to have been forgotten until the mid-1800s,
when the events leading up to enactment of the PCA began prior to the Civil
War. The Fugitive Slave Act of 1850 allowed federal marshals to call on the
discussion of the history and purpose of the Third Amendment, see William Sutton Fields, The Third
Amendment: Constitutional Protection from the Involuntary Quartering of Soldiers, 124 MIL. L. REV.
195 (1989).
37. U.S. CONST. amend. II ("A well regulated Militia, being necessary to the security of a free
State, the right of the people to keep and bear Arms, shall not be infringed.").
38. See Peter M. Sanchez, The "Drug War": The U.S. Military and National Security, 34 A.F. L.
REV. 109, 117 (1991) ("Despite [Alexander] Hamilton's assurances [in response to public fears
regarding a national army], the Constitution was only ratified after Federalists agreed to incorporate
the Bill of Rights." (quoting W. PETERS, A MORE PERFECT UNION 231-37 (1987))).
39. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
40. Id. amend. IV.
41. See Sanchez, supra note 38, at 118 (mentioning the belief that the Bill of Rights "would
effectively preclude the new government from usurping the rights of citizens, whether by military or
other means").
42. See THE FEDERALIST NO. 41, at 258-60 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961); see
also Dunlap, supra note 4, at 388 ("[IThe military is the antithesis of democracy." (footnote omitted));
Hardaway, supra note 30, at 80 (Colonial feeling was that a standing army "was simply incompatible
with a democratic system of government."). "The ideals of liberty, democracy, equality, and peace
have contrasted with the military's concern with authority, hierarchy, obedience, force, and war."
GOODPASTER & HUNTINGTON, supra note 21, at 7. "It ill behooves a democracy to become over-fond
of its soldiery," said one Founding Father. DeWitt C. Smith, Jr., From Yesterday's Fears to Today's
Realities, PARAMETERS, Fall 1977, at 90, 90.
The Founding Fathers' fear of a standing army is also evident in the constitutions of the thirteen
original states, which note that standing armies are "dangerous." See, e.g., N.H. CONST. pt. 1, art. 25
("Standing armies are dangerous to liberty, and ought not to be raised, or kept up, without consent of
the legislature."); VA. CONST. art. 1, § 13 ("[S]tanding armies, in time of peace, should be avoided as
dangerous to liberty; and ... in all cases the military should be under strict subordination to, and
governed by, the civil power."); see also H.W.C. Furman, Restrictions upon Use of the Army Imposed
by the Posse Comitatus Act, 27 MIL. L. REV. 85, 92 n.41 (1960).
43. See Smith, supra note 42, at 90.
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posse comitatus to aid in returning a slave to his owner.' In the context of the
Fugitive Slave Act, Attorney General Caleb Cushing issued an opinion
defining theposse comitatus to include the military even if entire units had to
be called upon while remaining under the direction of their own officers."
This use of the military by federal marshals became common; in Kansas, for
example, federal troops were used to quell disorder between pro- and anti-
slavery factions.46
The post-Civil War military presence in the South continued to foment a
distaste for military involvement in the civilian sphere.47 The military
presence was necessary to support the Reconstruction governments installed
in the South,48 but the situation came to a head during the 1876 presidential
election, which was determined by only one electoral vote.49 In the election,
Rutherford B. Hayes won with the disputed electoral votes of South Carolina,
Louisiana, and Florida.5" In those states, President Ulysses S. Grant had sent
troops as a posse comitatus for federal marshals to use at the polls, if
44. See Act of Sept. 18, 1850, ch. 60, 9 Stat. 462,462-63. See supra note 11 for the definition of
posse comitatus.
45. Extradition of Fugitives from Service, 6 Op. Att'y Gen. 466,473 (1854).
46. Furman, supra note 42, at 93.
47. See Lorence, supra note 11, at 169.
48. See id The military support of these governments was described as a "rotten-borough or
carpet-bag system." G. NORMAN LIEBER, U.S. WAR DEP'T, OFFICE OF THE JUDGE ADVOCATE GEN.,
DOC. NO. 64, THE USE OF THE ARMY IN AID OF THE CIVIL POWER 10 (1898) (quoting Rep. J.D.C.
Atkins).
In the Reconstruction South a monumental task faced the military:
Unplanned and aimed not at eradicating states but at hunying their return to the Union .... [the
Military Reconstruction Laws] one way or another imposed on the Army the duties of initiating
and implementing state-making on the basis of biracial citizen participation. Protecting the
personnel of the federal courts and Freedman's Bureau, shielding blacks and whites who
collaborated in the new order of equality under state law from retaliations by indignant vigilante
neighbors, and monitoring the quality of daily marketplace justice in ten thousand villages-these
were tasks that West Point had not prepared Army officers to perform.
Harold M. Hyman, Ulysses Grant I, Emperor of America?: Some Civil-Military Continuities and
Strains of the Civil War and Reconstruction, in THE UNITED STATES MILITARY UNDER THE
CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES, 1789-1989, at 175, 186 (Richard H. Kohn ed., 1991)
[hereinafter U.S. MILITARY UNDER THE CONSTITUTION].
The size of the standing army increased in post Civil War America. Emory Upton, The Military
Policy of the United States (1881) (unpublished manuscript) (see tables and charts), reprinted in S.
DOC. NO. 379, Ist Sess. (1916). With its increased size and permanence, the army began transforming
itself into a professional army. See id. With a standing army of significant size, the PCA became even
more important as a limit on the role of the military in society and as a shield from improper requests
by civilian authorities. See PCA Hearing, supra note 13, at 38-39 (statement of Christopher H. Pyle,
Professor, Mount Holyoke College).
49. Furman, supra note 42, at 94; Lorence, supra note 11, at 173-74.
50. See Lorence, supra note 11, at 172-74.
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol75/iss2/11
1997] THE POSSE COMITATUS ACT
necessary.5 This misuse of the military in an election-the most central event
to a democracy-led Congress to enact the PCA in 1878.52
III. THE SCOPE OF THE PCA
In the nearly 120 years that the PCA has been in effect, there have been no
criminal prosecutions under the Act, although it is a criminal statute.53 This
lack of criminal prosecutions has deprived courts of the opportunity to
interpret the PCA directly.5 4 Courts have had a few opportunities to interpret
the statute indirectly, however.5 Defendants have unsuccessfully raised the
PCA as a shield, contending that a violation of the Act divests the trial court
51. Furman, supra note 42, at 94-95, 94 & nn.56-57; Lorence, supra note 11, at 172.
52. Furman, supra note 42, at 94-96; see also LIEBER, supra note 48, at 10-12; Lorence, supra
note 11, at 174-79; cf. Federal Document Clearing House, Buyer Offers Amendment to Anti-terrorism
Legislation; Limits and Clarifies Role of Military, Gov't Press Release, June 14, 1995, available in
1995 WL 14249788 (suggesting that the PCA was also passed to prevent the use of troops to quell
labor disputes).
Grant's improper actions finally pushed the PCA through after several prior defeats. The original
text of the PCA read as follows:
From and after the passage of this act it shall not be lawful to employ any part of the Army of the
United States, as a posse comitatus, or otherwise, for the purpose of executing the laws, except in
such cases and under such circumstances as such employment of said force may be expressly
authorized by the Constitution or by act of Congress; and no money appropriated by this act shall
be used to pay any of the expenses incurred in the employment of any troops in violation of this
section and any person wilfully violating the provisions of this section shall be deemed guilty of a
misdemeanor and on conviction thereof shall be punished by fine not exceeding ten thousand
dollars or imprisonment not exceeding two years or by both such fine and imprisonment
Army Appropriations Act, ch. 263, § 15, 20 Stat. 145, 152 (1878). Congress adopted the modem text
of the PCA, see supra note 12, in 1956. See An Act to Codify Title 10 and Title 32, ch. 1041, § 18(a),
70A Stat. 1, 626 (1956) (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. § 1385 (1994)). The modem text was meant
"to restate, without substantive change, the law replaced." Id. § 49(a), 70A Stat. at 640.
In 1866, prior to the passage of the PCA, the Supreme Court cast doubt on the use of the military
to enforce the laws in place of civilian authorities, even in a time of stress. See Exparte Milligan, 71
U.S. (4 Wall.) 2 (1866).
53. CHARLES DOYLE, CONG. RES. SERV., No. 88-583A, USE OF THE MILITARY TO ENFORCE
CIVILIAN LAW: POSSE COMITATUS ACT AND OTHER CONSIDERATIONS 2 (1988); Furman, supra note
42, at 86; Interview with Brig. Gen. Walter B. Huffman, Asst. Judge Advocate Gen. for Military Law
and Operations, U.S. Army, in Burke, Va. (Dec. 31, 1995) [hereinafter Hufflman Interview]. In 1879,
two Army officers were indicted in Texas for violating the PCA after providing a U.S. marshall with
troops to enforce the revenue laws. LIEBER, supra note 48, at 28 n. 1. Other than this one mention, there
is no record that the officers were ever prosecuted.
54. See PCA Hearing, supra note 13, at 10 (statement of Edward S.G. Dennis, Jr., Chief,
Narcotics and Dangerous Drug Sec., Crim. Div., U.S. Dep't of Justice); Sanchez, supra note 38, at
120. The lack of opportunity for judicial interpretation will continue because military enforcement of
the PCA is seldom challenged in the courts. Id.
55. See infra Part III.B.
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of jurisdiction56 and that evidence gathered through a violation of the PCA
should be suppressed." The PCA has been successfully used where (1) the
involvement of the military drew into question whether federal law
enforcement officers were lawfully performing their duty5 8 and (2) a PCA
violation enabled the federal government to avoid liability under the Federal
Tort Claims Act59 because the tortious act in question "could not have been
authorized on behalf of the United States by any action short of a
Congressional enactment."'
This dearth of judicial interpretation has left "the parameters of the [PCA]
... substantially untested."'" Due to the resulting lack of clarity, the PCA
does not actually prohibit all so-called "exceptions" to its application, and
such exceptions-in-name have been enacted to clarify-or, depending upon
your view, alter-its boundaries62 and to provide guidance to military
commanders.63 The greatest uncertainties regarding the PCA concern what
56. See, e.g., Chandler v. United States, 171 F.2d 921, 935-36 (1st Cir. 1948), cert. denied, 336
U.S. 918 (1949) (finding jurisdiction where the Army arrested the defendant in Germany and returned
him to the United States); Ex parte Mason, 256 F. 384, 385-87 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1882) (finding
jurisdiction for military court in a court martial proceeding against a soldier for an attempted murder
while on guard duty at a civilian jail despite finding a PCA violation).
57. See United States v. McArthur, 419 F. Supp. 186 (D.N.D. 1975), affd sub. nim., United
States v. Red Feather, 541 F.2d 1275 (8th Cir. 1976), cert. denied sub nom., Casper v. United States,
430 U.S. 970 (1977); United States v. Red Feather, 392 F. Supp. 916 (D.S.D. 1975), affid, 541 F.2d
1275 (8th Cir. 1976); United States v. Jaramillo, 380 F. Supp. 1375 (D. Neb. 1974), appeal dismissed,
510 F.2d 808 (8th Cir. 1975). But see People v. Burden, 288 N.W.2d 392 (Mich. Ct. App. 1979)
(applying exclusionary rule to drug investigation in which a member of the U.S. Air Force participated
with the approval of his commander), rev'd, 303 N.W.2d 444 (Mich. 1981); Taylor v. State, 645 P.2d
522 (Okla. Crim. App. 1982) (applying the exclusionary rule for a PCA violation as a result of a
military police officer's active participation in a search and arrest).
58. See Jaramillo, 380 F. Supp. 1375 (D. Neb. 1974) (directed verdict on charge of obstruction
of law enforcement officers for defendants because the military's involvement in response to civil
disorder raised reasonable doubt whether the officers were in lawful performance of their duty), appeal
dismissed, 510 F.2d 808 (8th Cir. 1975).
59. Ch. 646, 62 Stat. 983 (1948) (codified as amended at28 U.S.C. § 2674 (1994)).
60. Wrynn v. United States, 200 F. Supp. 457, 465 (E.D.N.Y. 1961) (finding a PCA violation
where Air Force helicopter and pilots were used to search for civilian prison escapees and plaintiff was
injured when the helicopter landed).
61. PCA Hearing, supra note 13, at 10 (statement of Edward S.G. Dennis, Jr., Chief, Narcotics
and Dangerous Drug Sec., Crim. Div., U.S. Dep't of Justice) (citing REPORT OF THE TASK FORCE ON
EVALUATION OF AUDIT, INSPECTION AND INVESTIGATIVE COMPONENTS OF THE DEP'T OF DEFENSE
197 (1980)).
62. See infra notes 117-20 and accompanying text.
63. See PCA Hearing, supra note 13, at 12; H. REP. No. 97-71, pt. 2, at 3 (1981); see also
INTERNATIONAL & OPERATIONAL LAW DEP'T, THE JUDGE ADVOCATE GENERAL'S SCHOOL, U.S.
ARMY, DOC. NO. JA422, OPERATIONAL LAW HANDBOOK 22-2 (1995) [hereinafter ARMY LAW
HANDBOOK].
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constitutes "any part of the Army or Air Force''64 and what actions "execute
the laws."'
A. Elements of the Armed Forces Covered by the PCA
The PCA expressly applies only to the Army and Air Force.66 Congress
did not mention the Navy, Marine Corps, Coast Guard, or National Guard in
the PCA; accordingly, the PCA does not limit them.67 However, the
Department of Defense has extended by regulation the PCA's prohibitions to
the Navy and Marine Corps." Although, the Coast Guard is part of the armed
forces, in peacetime it falls under the authority of the Department of
64. 18 U.S.C. § 1385 (1994).
65. Id.; see DOYLE, supra note 53, at 12 (stating that "case law does not definitively answer the
question of what constitutes use to 'execute the laws').
66. 18 U.S.C. § 1385. The Air Force was expressly included under the PCA when Congress
codified Title 10 of the U.S. Code in 1956. United States v. Walden, 490 F.2d 372, 375 n.5 (4th Cir.
1974); see also supra note 52. The inclusion was natural because the Air Force was originally part of
the Army as the Army Air Corps. Walden, 490 F.2d at 374-75, 375 n.5. Even prior to 1956, Congress
included the Air Force under the PCA. See National Security Act of 1947, ch. 343, §§ 207(a), 208(a),
305(a), 61 Stat. 495, 502-04, 508.
67. See United States v. Yunis, 924 F.2d 1086 (D.C. Cir. 1991) (failing to extend PCA
prohibitions to the Navy where defendant was transported to the U.S. on a Navy vessel);
Schowengerdt v. General Dynamics Corp., 823 F.2d 1328 (9th Cir. 1987) (same), cert. denied, 503
U.S. 951 (1992). But see Walden, 490 F.2d at 375 (noting that failure to include the Navy in the text of
the PCA does not evince congressional approval of the Navy's use to enforce civilian laws), cert.
denied, 416 U.S. 983 (1979); People v. Caviano, 560 N.Y.S.2d 932, 936 & n.1 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1990)
(finding the PCA applicable to the Navy); People v. Blend, 175 Cal. Rptr. 263, 267 (Cal. Ct. App.
198 1) (stating that the PCA "applies to all branches of the federal military"). The first version of the
Act would have included "any part of the land or naval forces." 7 CONG. REC. 3586 (1878). The Navy
was possibly dropped to avoid a challenge under House rules for germaneness because the law was in
an army appropriations bill. Walden, 490 F.2d at 374; DOYLE, supra note 53, at 15; see 7 CONG. REC.
3845 (1878) (chronicling a the debate under the House rule for germaneness). Although it is unlikely,
another suggestion is that the failure to include the Navy was a drafting error. PCA Hearing, supra
note 13, at 22 (comments of Rep. William J. Hughes).
68. U.S. DEP'T OF DEFENSE, DIRECTIVE No. 5525.5, DOD COOPERATION WITH CIVILIAN LAW
ENFORCEMENT OFFICIALS encl. 4, at 4-6 (Jan. 15, 1986) (extending the PCA's application to the Navy
and Marine Corps "as a matter of DoD policy") [hereinafter DOD DIR. 5525.5], available at
<http://www.dtic.milladmt> (visited Jan. 1, 1996); SECRETARY OF THE NAVY, DEP'T OF THE NAVY,
INSTRUCTION NO. 5820.7B, COOPERATION WITH CIVILIAN LAW ENFORCEMENT OFFICIALS, OFFICE OF
THE SECRETARY 4 (Mar. 28, 1988) (same) [hereinafter SECNAVINST 5820.7B]. Interestingly, the
Code of Federal Regulations included a section applying the PCA to the Navy and Marines which
substantially followed the DoD Directive, compare DoD Cooperation with Civilian Law Enforcement
Officials, 32 C.F.R. pt. 213 (1992) with DOD DIR. 5525.5, supra, but the Defense Department repealed
the section in 1993 because it had "served the purpose for which [it was] intended and [is] no longer
valid." 58 Fed. Reg. 25,776 (Apr. 28, 1993) (repealing 32 C.F.R. pt. 213).
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Transportation 9 and has an express law enforcement function.7" Additionally,
the PCA only applies to forces in federal service, and therefore, the National
Guard is not limited by the PCA in its normal status of state service.7
Because the National Guard is the modem militia, this distinction actually
follows the intent of the PCA, which was not meant to limit militias.72 The
courts have also implicitly limited army to the official military establishment
rather than its broader plain meaning. 3
The breadth of the PCA in its application to "any part of the Army or Air
Force" is uncertain and can be a factual question.74 The PCA applies to on-
duty service members, but not to off-duty service members acting in a private
capacity.75 Conversely, when an off-duty service member acts under the
direction of military authorities, the PCA applies.76 Whether the PCA applies
to civilian employees of the armed forces remains undecided. On the basis of
general agency principles, the PCA should arguably apply to civilian
69. 14 U.S.C. § 1 (1994); DOYLE, supra note 53, at 16.
70. 14 U.S.C. § 2 (1994). As part of the drug interdiction effort, Coast Guard personnel are
detailed to Navy ships to perform their law enforcement function because the Navy cannot exercise the
powers of arrest or search and seizure. See 10 U.S.C. § 379 (1994). The Department of Justice has
taken the position that members from the other military branches are also not limited by the PCA when
detailed to the Department of Transportation, because they are not subject to military command or
charged to the military force structure. See Memorandum from William H. Rehnquist, Asst. Att'y
Gen., Office of Legal Counsel, U.S. Dep't of Justice, to Benjamin Forman, Asst. Gen. Counsel (Int'l
Affairs), U.S. Dep't of Defense 3 (Sept. 30, 1970) (Legality of Deputizing Military Personnel
Assigned to the Department of Transportation), in PCA Hearing, supra note 13, at 562, 564.
71. Furman, supra note 42, at 101; Sanchez, supra note 38, at 119. However, the National Guard
is still limited by applicable state law when in state service. Id.
72. DOYLE, supra note 53, at 17.
73. United States v. Jaramillo, 380 F. Supp. 1375, 1382 (1974) (excluding the Special Operations
Group of the United States Marshall Service from the definition of army under the PCA), appeal
dismissed 510 F.2d 808 (8th Cir. 1975). For a full discussion of the PCA and its application to all the
different elements of the military, see Furman, supra note 42, at 98-103 & 99 fig.
74. See, e.g., cases cited supra note 67. The "any part" language applies the PCA to any unit of
troops, regardless of "its size or designation." Jaramillo, 380 F. Supp. at 1379.
75. Congress acknowledged this fact during the debates regarding the enactment of the PCA,
admitting that the Act was not meant to limit a soldier as a citizen. See 7 CONG. REc. 4245 (1878)
(comments of Sen. Merrimon in response to a question of whether a soldier could come to the defense
of a fellow citizen being assaulted). Senator Merrimon stated in Congress:
If a soldier sees a man assaulting me with a view to take my life, he is not going to stand by and see
him to do it; he comes to my relief not as a soldier, but as a human being, a man with a soul in his
body, and as a citizen.
Id.
76. See DOD DIR. 5525.5, supra note 68, end. 4, at 4-6; SECNAVINST 5820.7B, supra note 68,
§9.b(4), at 7. The test has also been described as based upori the service member's conduct and upon
whether civilians were subjected to military power. See DOYLE, supra note 53, at 19.
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employees during the performance of their duties," but Department of
Defense regulations do not apply PCA restrictions to them. 8 Furthermore,
according to the Judge Advocate General, civilian employees of the Army are
technically not part of the military.79
B. What Action Constitutes a Violation of the PCA
The PCA proscribes the use of the military" "as a posse comitatus or
otherwise to execute the laws."8 Courts have used three formulations of an
active versus passive test to determine a PCA violation. All three
formulations result from litigation that ensued following the 1973 standoff
between federal authorities and the American Indian Movement at Wounded
Knee, South Dakota. 2 The formulations allow passive assistance in support
of law enforcement without causing a PCA violation. 3
In United States v. Red Feather,4 the court defined a PCA violation as
"direct active use of Army or Air Force personnel,"8 5 thus creating the passive
versus active dichotomy. The court found that a provision of military
equipment and supplies was not an active use of the military. 6 The court
77. See Clarence I. Meeks IH, Illegal Law Enforcement: Aiding Civil Authorities in Violation of
the Posse Comitatus Act, 70 MIL. L. REV. 83, 100 (1975). It would not suffice to allow the principal to
achieve a goal through an agent that the principal is proscribed from achieving herself. See id.
78. DOD DIR. 5525.5, supra note 68, encl. 4, at 406; SECNAVINST 5820.7B, supra note 68,
§ 9.b(3), at 7.
79. Furman, supra note 42, at 102-03 & n.109 (citing a 1956 opinion of the Judge Advocate
General of the U.S. Army). But see SECNAVINST 5820.78, supra note 68, at § 9.c(2) (extending the
PCA prohibitions to the Navy's civilian employees).
80. Because the PCA has been extended to the Navy and Marine Corps by regulation, see supra
note 68 and accompanying text, the term "military" is used in this Note to refer to the Army, Navy, Air
Force, and Marines Corps.
81. 18 U.S.C. § 1385 (1994); supra note 12 (text of the Act). The PCA also is limited to "willful"
use, see text accompanying supra note 12, but courts have not used the term to limit the PCA's scope.
DOYLE, supra note 53, at 11 n.18.
82. See infra notes 84-103 and accompanying text.
83. See DOYLE, supra 53, at 11-13. Courts and commentators have read the legislative history of
the PCA to allow "incidental" benefits to civilian law enforcement Id. at 13.
84. 392 F. Supp. 916 (D.S.D. 1975) (granting a motion in limine to exclude evidence of activities
of military personnel in a criminal prosecution for interfering with law enforcement officers at
Wounded Knee).
85. Id. at 921-23.
86. Id. at 923. The defendant was charged with interfering with law enforcement officers in
lawful execution of their duties. Id at 918-19. The government filed a motion in limine to bar evidence
of the loan of military equipment, of the military's presence, and of any other military involvement at
Wounded Knee. Id. at 918. The judge found that evidence of a PCA violation would be admissible
because it would relate to whether the federal officers acted in lawful execution of their duties, but
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found support for this position in Congress's passage of the Economy Act of
1932,7 which provides for the transfer of resources between executive
departments.8
In United States v. Jaramillo,"9 the court focussed on whether use of the
military "pervaded the activities" of the civilian law enforcement agencies to
determine a PCA violation.9" The court found that the provision of supplies
and equipment alone did not constitute a violation,9' and it concerned itself
with whether the military observers involved had too much influence over
civilian law enforcement decisions regarding negotiations, use of equipment,
and the policy on the use of force.92 Although the court did not necessarily
find a violation of the PCA, the evidence cast doubt on whether the federal
authorities were "lawfully engaged in the lawful performance of their official
duties."'93 Therefore, the court dismissed the indictment for obstructing law
enforcement officers.94
United States v. McArthur,95 approved by the Eighth Circuit in United
States v. Casper,96 promulgated the third formulation of the active versus
passive test and focussed on the individual subjected to the PCA violation.97
The McArthur formulation asked whether "military personnel subjected ...
citizens to the exercise of military power which was regulatory, proscriptive,
granted the motion to bar evidence of passive involvement. Id. at 925.
87. Ch. 314, § 601, 47 Stat. 382, 417-18 (1932) (codified as amended at 31 U.S.C. § 1535
(1994)).
88. Red Feather, 392 F. Supp. at 923.
89. 380 F. Supp. 1375, 1381 (D. Neb. 1974) (directing verdict for defendant charged with
obstructing law enforcement officers at Wounded Knee because a possible violation of the PCA raised
a reasonable doubt as to whether the officers acted in lawful performance of their duty), appeal
dismissed, 510 F.2d 808 (8th Cir. 1975).
90. Id. at 1379.
91. Id. The list of material provided by the military included star parachute flares, M-16
ammunition, protective vests, sniper rifles, and unarmed armored personnel carriers. Id.
92. See id. at 1380-81. Military observers counseled the federal authorities to substitute a shoot-
to-wound policy for their shoot-to-kill policy, encouraged negotiations, and approved the request for
armored personnel carriers with strict conditions on their use. Id. at 1379-80.
93. Id at 1381.
94. Id
95. 419 F. Supp. 186 (D.N.D. 1975) (finding that the approach of the court in Jaramillo, see
supra notes 89-94 and accompanying text, would not establish a PCA violation on the part of federal
authorities), affd sub nom., United States v. Red Feather, 541 F.2d 1275 (8th Cir. 1976), cert. denied
sub nom., Casper v. United States, 430 U.S. 970 (1977).
96. 541 F.2d 1275, 1278 (8th Cir. 1976) (referring with approval to the McArthur test formulated
in the district court), cert. deniedsub nom., Casper v. United States, 430 U.S. 970 (1977).
97. SeeMcArthur, 419 F. Supp. at 194.
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or compulsory in nature."9' On basically the same facts as Jaramillo, the
McArthur court found no PCA implications. 9 United States v. Yunis'" further
clarified the elements of the McArthur formulation: regulatory power
"controls or directs"; 1. proscriptive power "prohibits or condemns"; °2 and
compulsory power "exerts some coercive force."' 3
It should be noted that the PCA's effect is limited to the United States and
does not bar the military's support of law enforcement agencies abroad. In
Chandler v. United States,'" the court held that the PCA has no
extraterritorial effect. 5 However, some restrictions do exist on the military's
activities outside the United States. These restrictions arise out of military
regulations'"a and congressional acts that have limited military support to
foreign civilian law enforcement authorities.0 7
98. Id.
99. See id. at 194-95.
100. 681 F. Supp. 891 (D.D.C. 1988) (denying motion to dismiss indictment of airplane hijacker
who was transported to the United States on Naval vessels).
101. Id. at 895. A prisoner under the exclusive control and authority of civilian law enforcement
while being transported by the military is not subjected to military regulatory power. See id.
102. Id. at 896. A prisoner aboard a military vessel and confined by military personnel, but in the
custody of civilian law enforcement at all times, is not subjected to military proscriptive power. See id.
103. Id. Involvement of the military which is "indifferent, passive, and subservient" to civilian law
enforcement is not a PCA violation. See id.
104. 171 F.2d921 (lstCir. 1948).
105. Id. at 936. The Army arrested the defendant in Germany after World War I and then
transported him to the United States to face charges of treason. Id. at 927. The defendant, a U.S.
citizen, was convicted of treason for his propaganda radio broadcasts on behalf of the German
government during World War II. Id, at 928-29. The Ninth Circuit followed Chandler in dealing with
the arrest of Tokyo Rose and her return to the United States by military authorities. See Iva lkuko
Toguri D'Aquino v. United States, 192 F.2d 338, 351 (9th Cir. 1951), cert. denied, 343 U.S. 935
(1952). The Yunis court could have also found no PCA violation by following Chandler and
D'Aquino. See Yunis, 681 F. Supp. 891 (D.D.C. 1988) (finding no violation of the PCA under the
McArthur test, see supra notes 95-98 and accompanying text, where the allegedly unlawful military
involvement occurred outside the United States).
106. Huffman Interview, supra note 53.
107. See Foreign Assistance Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-559, § 30(a), 88 Stat. 1795, 1803
(codified as amended at 22 U.S.C. § 2420(a) (1994)). Under the Foreign Assistance Act, Congress
prohibited military foreign assistance monies from being spent to "provide training or advice ... for
police, prisons, or other law enforcement forces for any foreign government or any program of internal
intelligence or surveillance on behalf of any foreign government within the United States or abroad."
Id.; see also International Security Assistance Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-384, § 3, 92 Stat. 730, 730
(codified as amended at 22 U.S.C. § 2291(c) (1994)) (barring officers and employees of the United
States from making arrests in foreign countries as part of drug control efforts); DOYLE, supra note 53,
at 25.
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C. Exceptions to the PCA
The PCA explicitly recognizes constitutional and legislative exceptions to
its application.' The existence of any constitutional exceptions was
contested at the time of the PCA's enactment.'" Some proponents of the PCA
saw the exceptions as inherent in the executive powers of the President and in
his position as Commander-in-Chief of the armed forces, "' thus making
them beyond the reach of Congress to limit."' Others who supported the
PCA's passage recognized no such exceptions." 2 The existence of
constitutional exceptions to the PCA may only actually lie in the "twilight
zone" where the President may act where Congress has not, as described by
Justice Jackson's concurrence in Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer. 13
Another "constitutional" exception to the PCA is described by the
Department of Defense regulations based-upon the "inherent right of the U.S.
Government ... to ensure the preservation of public order and to carry out
governmental operations ... by force, if necessary."".4 The Office of Legal
Counsel of the Department of Justice has promulgated a similar view in
recognition of the U.S. government's power to protect federal functions.'
The power to protect federal functions has been so broadly interpreted,
however, that if accepted it would become the exception that swallows the
rule. Now-Chief Justice William Rehnquist interpreted this power to extend
to any "uniquely federal responsibility" while he was an attorney in the Office
of Legal Counsel." 6 However, this exception has yet to be tested in the courts
108. 18 U.S.C. § 1385 (1994) ("except in cases and under circumstances expressly authorized by
the Constitution or Act of Congress").
109. The statutory language recognizing constitutional exceptions in the PCA was a compromise.
110. 7 Cong. Rec. 4686 (1878); see U.S. CONST. art. 2, §§ 2,3.
111. Furman, supra note 42, at 91-92; Lorence, supra note 11, at 185-91.
112. DOYLE, supra note 53, at 20.
113. See 343 U.S. 579, 644-45 (1952) (Jackson, J., concurring); PCA Hearing, supra note 13, at
41 n.39 (statement of Christopher H. Pyle, Professor, Mount Holyoke College).
114. DOD DIR. 5525.5, supra note 68, encl. 4, § A(2)(c), at 4-2. The exception permits military
action to protect federal property and finctions, to prevent loss of life, and to restore public order when
local authorities cannot control a situation. Id. These exceptions have yet to be tested. DOYLE, supra
note 53, at 21 n.29. The Office of Legal Counsel at the Department of Justice bases the exception
explicitly on the President's duty to faithfully execute the laws. Memorandum from William H.
Rehnquist, Asst. Att'y Gen., Office of Legal Counsel, U.S. Dep't of Justice, to Robert E. Jordan IMl,
Gen. Counsel, U.S. Dep't of the Army 1-2 (May 11, 1970) (Authority to Use Troops to Protect Federal
Functions, Including the Safeguarding of Foreign Embassies in the United States) [hereinafter Federal
Functions Memorandum], in PCA Hearing, supra note 13, at 558, 559.
115. Federal Functions Memorandum, supra note 114, at 1-2.
116. Id.
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and would likely be interpreted as narrowly as the other exceptions to the
PCA.
Congress itself has recognized several exceptions to the PCA, t7 which
this Note categorizes as exceptions-in-fact and exceptions-in-name. 8 The
exceptions-in-fact are true exceptions that exempt otherwise criminal actions
under the PCA and alter its boundaries. Exceptions-in-name include
exceptions that are described or perceived as exceptions to the PCA, but
which authorize allowable acts under any of the court-created tests." 9
Exceptions-in-name do not alter the accepted boundaries of the PCA and do
not make previously criminal acts legal. They are sometimes simply termed
"clarifications."' 20
Exceptions-in-name allow the military to provide equipment and
supplies,' technical assistance,' information,"2  and training to law
enforcement agencies.24 Such provisions constitute passive assistance to
civilian law enforcement, which does not subject any civilian to the
regulatory, proscriptive, or coercive power of the military."
Exceptions-in-fact include protection of the rights of a discoverer of a
guano island," 6 removal of persons illegally occupying Indian lands,'27
117. See ARMY LAW HANDBOOK, supra note 63, at 22-2.
118. Others have implicitly recognized this distinction. See PCA Hearing, supra note 13, at 35-37
(comments by Christopher H. Pyle, Professor, Mount Holyoke College); Paul Jackson Rice, New Laws
and Insights Encircle the Posse Comitatus Act, 104 MIL. L. REV. 109 (1984). This Note makes the
distinction explicit here to illustrate that both types of exceptions have deleterious effects and should
be avoided.
119. See PCA Hearing, supra note 13, at 35-37 (comments of Christopher H. Pyle, Professor,
Mount Holyoke College).
120. See, e.g., PCA Hearing, supra note 13, at II (statement of Edward S.G. Dennis, Chief,
Narcotics and Dangerous Drug Sec., Crim. Div., U.S. Dep't of Justice). Congress intended to clarify
the boundaries of the PCA. ARMY LAW HANDBOOK, supra note 63, at 22-2.
121. 10 U.S.C. §§ 372, 381 (1994).
122. Id. § 373(2).
123. Id. § 371.
124. Id. § 373(1).
125. See supra notes 95-103 and accompanying text.
126. See 48 U.S.C. § 1418 (1994). This exception existed before the passage of the PCA. Act of
Aug. 18, 1856, ch. 164, § 5 11 Stat. 119, 120. Guano islands are islands rich in guano deposits. See 48
U.S.C. § 1411 (1994). Guano is "a substance that is found on some coasts or islands frequented by sea
fowl, is composed chiefly of their partially decomposed excrement, is rich in phosphates, nitrogenous
matter, and other material for plant growth, and has been used extensively as a fertilizer." WEBSTER'S
THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 1007 (1986).
A great rush of claims made on guano islands occurred from 1856 to 1903: 94 claims were made
during that period, and 66 islands were recognized by the State Department. JIMMY M. SKAGGS, THE
GREAT GUANO RUSH: ENTREPRENEURS AND AMERICAN OVERSEAS EXPANSION 200 (1994). The law
continues to have relevance because the United States still maintains possession of nine of the
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protection of national parks, 2 ' investigation of crimes against the President or
others in the line of succession, 129 and protection of civil rights where local
authorities do not or cannot protect them. 30 Exceptions-in-fact also include
the quelling of civil disturbances and labor strife that rises to the level of civil
disorder. For example, Troops were used to put down the Whiskey
Rebellion' long before the PCA was passed and to maintain order during
school desegregation in the South after the Act's passage. Troops have also
been used to quell riots in Detroit and other cities.3 2 More recently, they were
deployed on the streets of Los Angeles in 1992 after the Rodney King
verdict.'33
The courts have recognized another type of exception through the military
purpose doctrine, which is not explicitly mentioned in the PCA.'34 The
recognized islands. Id. For an in-depth discussion of the rush to claim guano-rich islands, see generally
SKAGGS, supra.
127. See 25 U.S.C. § 180 (1994). This exception may have also provided authority for the military
presence at Wounded Knee.
128. See 16 U.S.C. §§ 23 (detail of troops for protection of park), 78 (detail of troops to Sequoia
and Yosemite Parks), 593 (protection of timber in Florida) (1994).
129. See 18 U.S.C. § 1751(i) (1994).
130. See 10 U.S.C. §§ 331-333 (1994).
Other exceptions to the PCA, as listed in DOD DIR. 5525.5, supra note 68, encl. 4, § A.2(e), at 4-2
to 4-3, include:
(i) 16 U.S.C. § 1861(a) (1994) (enforcement of the Fishery Conservation and Management Act of
1976);
(ii) 18 U.S.C. §§ 112, 1116 (1994) (assistance to law enforcement officers in crimes against foreign
officials, official guests of the United States, and other internationally protected persons);
(iii) 18 U.S.C. § 351 (1994) (assistance to law enforcement officers in crimes against members of
Congress);
(iv) 22 U.S.C. §§ 408,461-462 (1994) (actions in support of the neutrality laws);
(v) 18 U.S.C. § 831 (1994) (assistance to law enforcement officers in crimes involving nuclear
materials);
(vi) 42 U.S.C. § 97 (1994) (execution of quarantine and certain health laws);
(vii) 43 U.S.C. § 1065 (1994) (removal ofunlawfifl inclosures from public lands);
(viii) 48 U.S.C. §§ 1422, 1591 (1994) (support for territorial governors if civil disorder occurs);
(ix) 50 U.S.C. § 220 (1994) (actions in support of certain customs laws); and
(x) 42 U.S.C. § 1989 (1994) (execution of certain wanants relating to enforcement of specified
civil rights laws).
131. Sanchez, supra note 38, 120 & n.13.
132. See Jerry M. Cooper, Federal Military Intervention in Domestic Disorders, in U.S. MILITARY
UNDER THE CONSTITUTION, supra note 48, at 120.
133. See generally Kurt Andrew Schlichter, Comment, Locked and Loaded: Taking Aim at the
Growing Use of the American Military in Civilian Law Enforcement Operations, 26 LOY. L.A. L. REV.
1291 (1993) (the author served as an Army National Guardsman deployed to Los Angeles during the
riots); Eric Schmitt, Elite U.S. Forces Sent in to Perform a Rare Role, N.Y. TIMES, May 2, 1992, § 1,
at 8. For a discussion of the military's use in relation to civil disorder, see Cooper, supra note 132.
134. See DOYLE, supra note 53, at 13-14.
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doctrine allows the military to enforce civilian laws on military installations,
to police themselves, and to perform their military functions even if there is
an incidental benefit to civilian law enforcement."3 5 However, the doctrine is
interpreted by the McArthur formulation-whether a person is subjected to
military power that is regulatory, proscriptive, or coercive 136 when the
activities occur off-base.
37
D. Allowable Domestic Uses of the Military
There are many other uses of the military which seem to implicate the
PCA, but are not within its scope because law is not being enforced. Since the
passage of the PCA, the military has been used several times for domestic
purposes that do not conform to its traditional role. The PCA proscribes use
of the army in civilian law enforcement, but it has not prevented military
assistance in what have been deemed national emergencies, such as strike
replacements and disaster relief. However, these emergencies differ in
character from other exceptions to the PCA by their very nature as
emergencies and by the duration of the military involvement.
Presidents Richard Nixon and Ronald Reagan both used the military to
replace striking federal employees. In 1970, President Nixon sent 30,000
federal troops to replace striking postal workers in New York, 3' and in 1981,
President Reagan replaced striking air traffic controllers.'39 The military has
also been used to replace striking coal miners. 40
Disaster relief, another common use of the military, does not seem to
violate the PCA because it is not a mission executing the laws. In the 1906
San Francisco earthquake, the Army led the effort to put out fires and restore
order. More recently, Hurricane Hugo in Florida resulted in a large military
presence during the relief effort.'4 ' However, the military also found itself
135. Id.
136. See supra notes 95-103 and accompanying text
137. DOYLE, supra note 53, at 14.
138. JAMES B. JACOBS, SocIo-LEGAL FOUNDATIONS OF CML-MILITARY RELATIONS 54 (1986).
139. Id. at 55.
140. For a thorough discussion of the use of the military in labor disputes, see JOAN M. JENSEN,
ARMY SURVEILLANCE IN AMERICA, 1775-1980, at 44-45, 139-40 (1991) and Jacobs, supra note 138,
at 51-76.
141. See, e.g., Edmund L. Andrews, Army Has Trouble Building Beachhead in Disaster Zone,
N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 31, 1992, at AI0; Edmund L. Andrews, Urgency Is Growing: 4 Days After
Hurricane, Thousands Still Need Food and Shelter, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 28, 1992, at Al; see also
Stephanie Nano, Flood Area Hails Tardy Old Friend: The Sun, S.F. EXAMINER, July 19, 1993, at Al
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providing election facilities in Florida-a situation too similar to that which
precipitated the passage of the PCA in 1876.42
IV. EXCEPTIONS TO THE PCA ENDANGER THE MILITARY AND THE
UNITED STATES
The PCA's exceptions-in-name and exceptions-in-fact endanger the
military and the United States by blurring the traditional line between military
and civilian roles, undermining civilian control of the military, damaging
military readiness, and providing the wrong tool for the job.'43 Besides the
current drug interdiction exceptions, the 104th Congress considered two bills
to create new exceptions to the PCA.' 44 The Border Integrity Act141 would
have created an exception to allow direct military enforcement of
immigration and customs laws in border areas. 46 The Comprehensive
Antiterrorism Act'47  would have allowed military involvement in
investigations of chemical and biological weapons. 48 This Note will discuss
these two proposed exceptions together with the exception mandating
military involvement in counter-drug operations to illustrate the negative
effects of creating exceptions to the PCA. Increasing direct military
involvement in law enforcement through border policing-an exception-in-
fact' 49 -is an easy case against which to argue. Investigative support-an
exception-in-name 150-is passive, indirect enforcement. Drug interdiction-
an exception-in-name for the most part-falls between border policing and
investigative support because of the extensive military involvement.
(mentioning President Clinton's offer of federal troops to help with cleanup after floods in the
Midwest); Jeffrey Schmalz, Troops Find Looting and Devastation on St. Croix, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 22,
1989, at A22 (reporting the use of federal troops on St. Croix after Hurricane Hugo).
142. Huffman Interview, supra note 53.
143. This Note does not project immediate doom nor suggest that the armed forces or its members
would consider a military coup or improperly influence the civilian government. Indeed, within the
U.S. Army officer corps there exists "an implicit-one could almost say instinctive-acceptance of the
civil power's superiority to the military in government." Edward M. Coffinan, The Army Officer and
the Constitution, PARAMETERS, Sept. 1987, at 2, 2. This Note argues that there are good reasons for the
policies behind the PCA, policies that should not be discarded by the exigencies of the moment. Id.
144. See supra notes 5-7 and accompanying text.
145. H.RL 1224, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. (1995).
146. See supra note 7 and accompanying text.
147. S. 735, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. (1995).
148. See supra note 6 and accompanying text.
149. See supra notes 117-20, 126-33 and accompanying text.
150. See supra notes 117-25 and accompanying text.
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A. Blurring the Lines
The differences in the role of civil law enforcement and the role of the
military are blurred by the PCA's exceptions. Civilian law enforcement is
traditionally local in character, responding to needs at the city, county, or state
level. Civilian law enforcement trains for the law enforcement mission, which
differs from the military mission.' Civilian law enforcement requires the
cognizance of individual rights and seeks to protect those rights, even if the
person being protected is a bad actor. Prior to the use of force, police officers
attempt to de-escalate a situation. Police officers are trained to use lesser
forms of force when possible to draw their weapons only when they are
prepared to fire.
On the other hand, soldiers are trained when to use or not to use deadly
force.'52 Escalation is the rule. The military exists to carry out the external
mission of defending the nation. Thus, in an encounter with a person
identified with the enemy, soldiers need not be cognizant of individual rights,
and the use of deadly force is authorized without any aggressive or bad act by
that person.'53 This difference between soldiers and police has been tragically
illustrated in the recent shooting of a young man by marines patrolling near
the Mexican border.5 4
The exceptions of border duty, investigative support, and drug interdiction
blur the traditional line between civilian law enforcement and the role of the
151. See PCA Hearing, supra note 13, at 29-30 (comments by Rep. William J. Hughes).
152. Soldiers do receive training in intermediate levels of force for peacekeeping missions, but the
main focus is on how and when to use deadly force as part of the wartime rules of engagement.
Huffman Interview, supra note 513(LANE Training provides soldiers with examples of hostile acts
which can be responded to without waiting to be fired upon which consist of simulation exercises in a
field setting); see also Anthony DePalma, Canada Assesses Army: Warriors or Watchdogs?, N.Y.
TIMES, Apr. 13, 1997, § 1, at 4 (noting increase of U.S. training for peacekeeping); Mark S. Martins,
Rules of Engagement for Land Forces: A Matter of Training, Not Lawyering, 143 MIL. L. REv. 3, 27
(1994). This focus flows directly from the military's responsibility "to fight or be ready to fight wars
should the occasion arise." Toth v. Quarles, 350 U.S. 11, 17 (1955), cited in Dunlap, supra note 4, at
357 n. 119. To fulfill that responsibility, the Army has challenged itself to "[i]mprove[] lethality and
readiness" in the 21st century. Dennis J. Reimer, Soldiers Are Our Credentials, MIL. REV., Sept.-Oct.
1995, at 4, 13 fig.5 (at the time of this writing the author was U.S. Army Chief of Staff).
153. See generally Martins, supra note 152. It is interesting that we want the military to take on
some police functions, yet we will not let that same military train foreign police or even give them
advice. See Foreign Assistance Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-559, § 30(a), 88 Stat. 1795, 1803 (codified
as amended at 22 U.S.C. § 2420(a) (1994)); see also supra note 107 and accompanying text.
154. Jesse Katz, A Good Shepherd's Death, L.A. TIMES, June 21, 1997, at Al (chronicling the
debate about troops use near the border as the danger is illustrated by this killing); Border Killing
Brings Criticism of Military Role, CHICAGO TRIB., May 23, 1997, at 15.
1997]
Washington University Open Scholarship
WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW QUARTERLY
military. Border duty by soldiers under the Border Integrity Act has
traditionally been the responsibility of civilian law enforcement. Drug
interdiction has traditionally been a task for civilian law enforcement, and
long-term military involvement comes close to subjecting civilians to all three
types of military power-a fear of the Founding Fathers.' Investigative
support by the military is very reminiscent of the military surveillance
conducted in the 1960s, which was condemned by Congress and members of
the Supreme Court as an improper use of the military.
156
B. Undermining Civilian Control of the Military
Civilian control of the military is undermined whenever military activities
invade areas that "endanger liberties or the democratic process, even when
that expansion is sanctioned by the civilian leadership."' 57 The military
should not gain "unwarranted influence" in civilian affairs. 51 The purpose of
civilian control is "to ensure that defense policy and the agencies of defense
policy are subordinated to other national traditions, values, customs,
governmental policies, and economic and social institutions."'5 9 The civilian
government must therefore consider the institutional characteristics of the
military, including personnel, doctrine, training, equipment, and morale,
when making policy decisions about the domestic use of the military.' 60 A
military with many nonmilitary functions is more "autonomous" and thus
under less civilian control.161
In the case of counter-drug activities, the government has disregarded all
these considerations. The counter-drug mission is not a good fit for the
military: the chronic nature of the drug problem requires the military's deep
155. See supra notes 22-43 and accompanying text.
156. See Laird v. Tatum, 408 U.S. 1 (1972).
157. Dunlap, supra note 4, at 344 (emphasis removed).
158. Id. at 343 (emphasis removed) (paraphrasing President Eisenhower's Farewell Address).
159. Id. at 344 (quoting ALLAN R. MILLET, THE AMERICAN POLITICAL SYSTEM AND CIVILIAN
CONTROL OF THE MILITARY 2 (1979)).
160. Id. at 344 n.13 (quoting MILLET, supra note 159, at 2).
161. GOODPASTER & HUNTINGTON, supra note 21, at 22 (citing David 1R. Segal et al.,
Convergence, Isomorphism, and Interdependence at the Civil-Military Interface, J. POL. & MIL. SOC.,
Fall 1974, at 157ff).
A military establishment.., that encompasses many nonmilitary functions and that operates in a
civilianized manner is likely to be more autonomous-freer from civilian contacts and, potentially,
civilian control-than a military establishment that is purely military and that, precisely because of
its specialization, is dependent upon civilian society for support
Id. (quoting Segal, supra) (footnote omitted).
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involvement over time without any true success162 because the high
profitability of drug trafficking makes its complete deterrence impossible. 6
This involvement without success hurts morale,"6 and the long-term nature of
the involvement cannot help but increase the "unwarranted influence" of the
military in civilian affairs."
Both border duty and investigative support, if enacted, would create the
same concerns as the counter-drug mission. Increasing the involvement of the
military in civilian law enforcement will make it difficult to maintain the
military's subordinate role over the long-term. Additionally, use of the
military in civilian law enforcement damages its professionalism, which the
PCA's enactment helped to develop. Many of these same concerns underlay
the government's reluctance to send the military abroad without clear criteria
and timelines for withdrawal," s yet those concerns have been ignored in
162. See McGee, supra note 3, at A30. "[The military's involvement] should [have been] a
temporary stopgap, but it's been institutionalized." Id. (quoting Lawrence J. Korb, Asst. Sec'y of
Defense under President Reagan) (second set of brackets in original).
163. See 134 CONG. REC. 11,643, at 11,644 (1988) (comments of Sen. Daniel P. Moynihan)
(stating that "100 of the [illegal aliens crossing the Mexican border into the U.S.] could bring across a
year's supply and more of Mexican heroin for the American market"); see also PETER REITER Er AL.,
RAND CORP., SEALING THE BORDERS: THE EFFECTS OF INCREASED MILITARY PARTICIPATION IN
DRUG INTERDICTION 123 (1988) (stating that "a single cargo plane, fully loaded, could supply the
nation's current demand [for cocaine] for a year"); Michael H. Abbott, The Army and the Drug War:
Politics or National Security?, PARAMETERS, Dec. 1986, at 95, 96 (noting that drugs are second to
petroleum, in monetary value, as the largest U.S. import); Christopher S. Wren, Why Seizing Drugs
Barely Dents Supply, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 15, 1996, § 4, at 4 (reporting that increased seizures of illegal
drugs do not increase costs to the drug user).
164. Cf Thomas E. Ricks, The Military: The Great Society in Camouflage, ATLANTIC MONTHLY,
Dec. 1996, at 24, 38 (stating that "murky new missions ... may be chipping away at the Army's sense
of itself"); DePalma, supra note 152.
165. See McGee, supra note 3, at A30 ("[T]he open-ended nature of the military's commitment is
the greatest potential hazard." (interview with Lawrence J. Korb, Assistant Sec'y of Defense under
President Reagan)). At least one critic sees the expansion of the Junior Reserve Officer's Training
Program, the large number of retired military personnel working as teachers, and the appointment of a
retired general as the "drug czar" and another as head of the D.C. school system as steps towards
militarization and a decline in civilian control of the military. Courtland Milloy, Overruling Civilian
Rule, WASH. POST, Nov. 13, 1996, at BI (describing the views of Sam Smith, editor of the Progressive
Review).
166. See, e.g., Clifford Krauss, The Somalia Mission: Congress; Clinton Gathers Congress
Support, N.Y. TIMES, OcL 8, 1993, at A14 (noting Congress's approval of President Clinton's plan to
limit the goals of U.S. forces in Somalia and commit to an end date for troop deployment); Elaine
Sciolino, Loosening the Timetablefor Bringing G.L's Home, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 17, 1996, § 4, at 3
(discussing military doctrine of no overseas deployment without a specific timetable for withdrawal);
Elaine Sciolino, U.S. Narrows Termsfor Its Peacekeepers, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 23, 1993, at A8 (noting
anxiety within Clinton administration over "open-ended peacekeeping missions in Somalia and
Bosnia"); Senatorial Passion: U.S. Interest or Deadly Quagmire?, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 14, 1995, at A15
(quoting from Senate debate about sending troops to Bosnia and the fear of an open-ended mission).
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domestic military use.
C. Damaging Military Readiness
The military's primary mission is national security, and the wisdom of all
military decisions is ultimately weighed against whether national security is
enhanced or damaged. Military readiness is a key to modem warfare and to
the maintenance of national security. 67 In recognition of this fact, the military
can refuse a request for aid in drug interdiction and in the investigation of
chemical and biological weapons if military readiness might be
compromised. 6 However, this power of refusal does not prevent injury to
military readiness,'6 9 because while the military still takes on these missions,
their mere consideration injures readiness through the redirection of resources
in the decisionmaking process by adding a nonmilitary factor to the
decision. 7 '
The border duty, investigative support, and drug interdiction exceptions
are double-edged swords with respect to military readiness. The military has
embraced new missions like drug interdiction as a way to preserve force
structure and budget levels and to improve public relations.' 7' In this respect,
these new missions may aid readiness by preserving support for military
strength and funding, but this benefit is outweighed by the shift of focus
slightly awayfrom the mission to fight a war.' This change of focus lessens
But see Sciolino, Loosening the Timetablefor Bringing G.L 's Home, supra, at 3 (reporting criticism of
establishing a clear exit strategy for troops deployed overseas).
167. Reimer, supra note 152, at 9 (stating that "readiness and training ... [are] the reason the
Army exists").
168. See Department of Defense Authorization Act, 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-86, § 905(a)(1), 95 Stat.
1099, 1116 (1981) (codified as amended at 10 U.S.C. § 376 (1994))); PCA Hearing, supra note 13, at
16 (statement of William H. Taft IV, Gen. Counsel, U.S. Dep't of Defense).
169. To be effective the military would have to be able to say "no," but it is actually marketing
itself with a 55-page pamphlet to local law enforcement. See McGee, supra note 3, at A30.
170. "[R]eadiness is a tough, continuous job." Smith, supra note 42, at 91 (emphasis added). The
most "productive"--and full-time-purpose of the military during peacetime is the deterrence of war.
Id. As Elihu Root said, the goal of the military is "[n]ot to promote war, but to preserve peace through
intelligent and adequate preparation." Id.
171. See Ricks, supra note 164, at 38 (noting the need for the Army to justify its existence
"[a]rguably for the first time in its existence"); William Rosenau, NonTraditional Missions and the
Future of the U.S. Military, FLETCHER F. WORLD AEF., Winter/Spring 1994, at 31, 32 (suggesting that
non-military missions could protect the infrastructure of the Army by giving it "a new organizational
vision").
172. These new missions occur at a time when the Army has increased its overseas operational
deployments by 300%, but has been forced to accommodate for diminishing resources. See Reimer,
supra note 153, at 5, 7; see also Ronald B. Flynn, The National Guard Drug Interdiction Mission: A
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the fighting edge of the military'7 3 and dampens the "warrior spirit. 1 74
Additionally, these missions require equipment modifications and the
reallocation of resources.17 For example, F-15 pilots do not hone their
dogfighting skills by tracking a single-engine Cessna flying north from
Mexico; in the Gulf War, there were stories of inadequately trained National
Guard units that had participated more frequently in nontraditional missions,
yet were incapable of fulfilling their military mission.
7 6
The three exceptions to the PCA affect military readiness in a variety of
ways. Drug interdiction has injured military readiness as a result of expensive
equipment modifications and the redirection of resources. The 1993
Department of Defense budget included more than $1.4 billion for drug
interdiction missions. 77 This budget allocation has resulted in a "drug
command" of sorts which is entirely focussed on the domestic mission of
drug interdiction.'78 Border duty requires a different mindset and a different
Circumvention of Posse Comitatus? 21 (Apr. 2, 1990) (unpublished U.S. Army War College Military
Studies Program Paper, available through Defense Technical Information Center) (contending that the
military's involvement in the counter-drug effort detracts from training readiness as it relates to war-
fighting). But see Dale E. Brown, Drugs on the Border: The Role of the Military, PARAMETERS,
Winter 1991-92, at 50, 50 (describing military involvement in counter-drug efforts as "valuable, real-
world training for the participating units").
173. Mike O'Connor, Does Keeping the Peace Spoil G.L 'sfor War?, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 13, 1996,
at A3 (discussing the need for approximately 18 months of rest and retraining to reestablish the basic
military readiness of the Army troops who were deployed in Bosnia); see also DePalma, supra note
152. The work of U.S. soldiers in Bosnia "runs counter to their traditional training" and their skills are
perishable. Id. One sergeant, a tanker, spends each day checking identification at a checkpoint. Id. As a
result of mostly working in small groups, the soldiers' ability to work in large coordinated groups
suffers. Id.
174. Dunlap, supra note 17; see Ricks, supra note 164, at 38.
175. In fiscal year 1990, forty-eight percent of all AWACS, radar surveillance planes, flying hours
worldwide were devoted to counter-drug efforts. Brown, supra note 172, at 53. In the case of the
National Guard, 532,899 man-days and 5155 missions were devoted to the counter-drug effort. Id.
176. See Alex Prud'Homme, Phantom Army: For the Most Part the National Guard Fought Well
in the Gulf but Some Outfits, Plaqued by No-Shows and Poor Training, Never Got to the Front, TIME,
June 10, 1991, at 18; see also DARPA Seeks to Upgrade National Guard Training, DEF. &
AEROSPACE ELECS., Feb. 22, 1993 (noting the National Training Center did not believe that National
Guard troops called up for the Persian Gulf War were not combat ready), available in 1993 WL
289339; National Guard: Peacetime Training Did not Adequately Prepare Combat Brigades for Gulf
War, GEN. ACCT. OFF. REP. & TESTIMONY, Dec. 1, 1991 (referencing GAO report on lack of
readiness of National Guard troops), available in 1991 WL 2659334. This turns on the use of the
National Guard in nontraditional missions, when their active service time should be spent honing their
fighting capabilities so that they can back up the regular army in time of war.
177. Dunlap, supra note 17, at 69.
178. See McGee, supra note 3, at A30 (discussing the military's counter-drug headquarters). This
"drug command" is referred to as Joint Task Force Six ("JTF-6"). JTF-6 circulates a 55-page pamphlet
to local law enforcement, which in effect markets Green Berets, Navy SEAL teams, and other services.
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level of restraint than warfare,' 79 thus disrupting the optimum culture and
mindset needed to maintain national security. Investigatory support by the
military is also a mission differing from that which currently exists in the
military. 8 ' To redirect resources or to consider performing such nonmilitary
missions involves considerations that lessen the importantance of strictly
improving military readiness, even when the only question is where to train.
D. Wrong Tool for the Job
Illegal immigration, drug interdiction, and investigative support relating to
terrorism are all long-term problems requiring long-term solutions. These
problems are not easily resolved, however, and no foreseeable end to the
military's involvement appears forthcoming.' 8 ' Because of the significance of
the problems and their continuing and chronic nature, using the military to
combat these problems is like using a sledge hammer to open a locked trunk
when all one needs is the key. It is better to fashion a key than to destroy the
trunk.
All three exceptions to the PCA require using the wrong tool for the job.
For example, border duty forces the military to alter its mindset and training.
The border patrol and other law enforcement agencies already have the
proper mindset and qualifications and are better able to do the job. Using an
F-15 to track drug smugglers' slow planes is both excessive and expensive. A
basic military soldier costs the government $82,000 a year in training and
upkeep. A soldier's involvement in drug interdiction is much more expensive
than a civilian counterpart's participation. Investigatory support for weapons
of mass destruction to counter terrorism is more than a minor exception
because terrorism is a continuing problem without end. We would best be
Id.
179. Border duty consists of patrolling the U.S. border to stop illegal entry and enforcing customs
laws at border entry points.
180. To fulfill this mission, it is entirely reasonable for the military to begin civilian surveillance
again under the same rationale used in the 1960s. See supra note 16 and accompanying text.
181. See Wren, supra note 163, at 4 (noting that drug trafficking does not seem to follow basic
economic principles). Increased seizures have not increased the cost to users of illegal drugs. Id.
Increased interdiction results in increased seizures, but those seizures only increase transportation
expenses; the drug dealers are hassled, but the drug flow continues. Id.
The 1996 price of cocaine is only one-fifth of the 1981 price, and heroin is less than half of its
1980 price. William March, Drugs Ignore Politicians, TAMPA TRIB., Sept. 28, 1996, at 1. In 1981,
Congress began involving the military in the drug war. See supra note 9-10 and accompanying text.
Obviously, military involvement and increased seizures have not helped to turn the tide in the drug
war, it is being lost.
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served by developing these resources in civilian law enforcement.'
V. RENEWAL OF THE POLICY EMBODIED BY THE PCA
The fundamental precept of maintaining the separation between the
military and civilian spheres of action83 must be renewed, not eroded by
exceptions. Both exceptions-in-name and exceptions-in-fact should be
avoided because they injure that separation.184 To maintain the principle that
animates the PCA, the PCA should be reaffirmed and strengthened. Below
are three possible approaches.
One approach is to do nothing, but to do nothing would only leave the
situation in its current unacceptable state. The military is seen as a panacea to
many domestic problems that do not properly fall within the military sphere.
Congress may resolve to leave the PCA alone, but it should be remembered
that in 1878 the PCA was enacted precisely because the government had to be
reminded of the fundamental principle of separating the military from the
civilian sphere.8 5 The need to remind, or re-remind, government of that
fundamental principle exists today.
Another approach is to amend the Constitution, but this is less appealing
than the first approach. A constitutional amendment by its very nature would
strengthen the principle of excluding the military from the execution of
civilian laws, but it is inflexible. In this case, a constitutional amendment
would limit the powers of the President by limiting his authority as
Commander-in-Chief and executor of the laws.'86 If these powers are
qualified by Congress, as some commentators suggest,'87 then the amendment
would only add inflexibility to the Constitution, thereby weakening one of its
greatest assets. 88 Normally, the "twilight zone"'89 of Presidential power
182. See Editorial, False Choices on Terrorism, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 30, 1995, § 4, at 14 (suggesting
that the F.B.I. should receive more funding and use it to improve the training of agents); Editorial,
Washington's Undeclared War on Drugs, ST. LOUIS POST-DISPATCH, Dec. 8, 1996, at 2B (suggesting
that the drug war is best handled by agencies other than the military). These resources need to be
developed when civilian law enfbrcement is not able to take full advantage of information provided by
the military. See Ted Waronicki, Letter to the Editor, War on Drugs Must Begin in the Home, TAMPA
TRIB., Oct. 20, 1996, at 3 (noting that civilian law enforcement agencies attempted to apprehend only a
small percentage of suspicious aircraft identified by the military).
183. See supra Part II.
184. See supra Part IV.
185. See supra notes 47-52 and accompanying text.
186. See supra notes I 10-13 and accompanying text.
187. See supra note 111 and accompanying text.
188. See Kathleen M. Sullivan, Constitutional Constancy: Why Congress Should Cure Itself of
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provides enough flexibility to allow the United States to best meet the
uncertainties of the future. A constitutional amendment would remove the
"twilight zone" with respect to military use. It might be possible to amend the
Constitution to allow nonmilitary use of the military through the exercise of
emergency powers, but the resulting amendment would still create a fixed
standard that might not foresee some future event, making it unacceptable.'
Additionally, a constitutional amendment should not be enacted unless
absolutely necessary for the functioning of our government or society.'9'
The third and best approach, is a legislative reaffirmation of the
fundamental principle behind the PCA with added guidelines to help focus
considerations of PCA exceptions. Legislative action refocusses the debate on
the use of the military from the pressing problems into which they may
possibly be drawn and retains the flexibility that a constitutional amendment
would remove. Additionally, the legislative solution maintains flexibility yet
Congress and the President remain constrained by public opinion in their use
of the military. 2 This Note proposes that Congress repeal the PCA in Title
18 and enact the following statute in Title 10:
(a) Any part of the armed forces, 93 excluding the Coast Guard, is
prohibited from acting as aposse comitatus or otherwise to execute the
laws, except in cases and under circumstances expressly authorized by
the Constitution or Act of Congress.'94
(b) Exceptions to paragraph (a) allowing use of the armed forces must
Amendment Fever, 17 CARDOZO L. REv. 691, 700 (1996). "It would have been an unwise attempt to
provide, by immutable rules, for exigencies which, if foreseen at all, must have been seen dimly, and
which can be best provided for as they occur." Id. (quoting McCullogh v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4
Wheat.) 316,415 (1819) (Marshall, C.J.)).
189. See supra note 113 and accompanying text.
190. See Sullivan, supra note 188, at 700-01.
191. See generally Sullivan, supra note 188 (discussing arguments against constitutional
amendments in general); cf Ronald L. Goldfarb, The 11,000th Amendment: There's a Rush to Amend
the Constitution, and It Shows No Signs ofLetting Up, WASH. POST (Nat'l Weekly Ed.), Nov. 25-Dec.
1, 1996, at 22, 22-23 (noting that over 11,000 amendments have been proposed in Congress since
1789-more than one a week). As Professor Kathleen Sullivan has said, "[Tihere are strong structural
reasons for amending the Constitution only reluctantly and as a last resort. This strong presumption...
has been bedrock in our constitutional history, and there is no good reason for overturning it now."
Sullivan, supra note 188, at 694.
192. See GOODPASTER & HUNTINGTON, supra note 21, at 26.
193. Title 10 defines the term "armed forces" to "mean the Army, Navy, Air Force, Marine Corps,
and Coast Guard." 10 U.S.C. § 101(a)(4) (1994).
194. See supra text accompanying note 12 for the current text of the PCA and note the use of the
same phrasing.
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meet the following criteria:
(1) the use must be triggered by an emergency, which is
defined as any occasion or instance for which Federal assistance is
needed to supplement State and local efforts and capabilities to save
lives and to protect property and public health and safety, or to lessen
or avert the threat of a catastrophe'g--generally a sudden, unexpected
event;196
(2) the use must be beyond the capabilities of- civilian
authorities; and
(3) the use must be one limited in duration and not one which
addresses a chronic, continuing issue or problem.
(c) Clarifications to prohibitions in subsection (a) are to be made by
regulations to be published in the Federal Register and printed in the
Code of Federal Regulations.
(d) This section is an affirmation of the fundamental precept of the
United States of separating the military and civilian spheres of
authority.
(e) Nothing in this section shall be construed to affect the law
enforcement functions of the United States Coast Guard.
First, a repeal of the PCA in Title 18, Crimes and Criminal Procedure, and
recodification into Title 10, Armed Forces, would bring the law into line with
its current function and force. The PCA is a law of policy, both in application
and political discourse. The total lack of prosecutions under the PCA
197
causes the law to lack force and credibility, because the crime is going
unpunished. Recodification recognizes the law as a limitation on the use of
the military without losing credibility due to the lack of enforcement.
Additionally, other criminal statutes would cover misappropriation of military
services,'9" or Congress could modify them to cover activity prohibited by the
PCA. The 94th Congress considered such a recodification. 99
195. This definition is taken nearly verbatim from 42 U.S.C. § 5122(1) (1994) (regarding disaster
relief).
196. This language is derived from 15 U.S.C. § 2655(c) (1994).
197. See supra note 53 and accompanying text
198. The statutes that currently cover embezzlement or misappropriation of federal services,
funds, or equipment would fill the void left by repeal of the PCA from Title 18.
199. See S. 1, 94th Cong. 1st Sess., tit. H, pt. G. The text of the bill proposed the following text as
a re-enactment of the PCA in 10 U.S.C. § 127:
Whoever, except in cases and under circumstances expressly authorized by the Constitution or Act
of Congress, knowingly uses any part of the Army, Navy, or Air Force as a posse comitatus or
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The general language in subsection (a) of the proposed law would be
substantially similar to the current wording of the PCA.2 ° This language
leaves some of the ambiguity and vagueness in the law, which in turn leaves
intact the flexibility of the current law and clearly marks it as a continuation
of the PCA. Past interpretations of the PCA would therefore apply equally to
the proposed law as they do to the current law.
However, one significant change in the language extends the principle of
the PCA to the Navy and Marine Corps by reference to "the armed forces."
This extension broadens the language of the PCA2°' and makes the current
policy-as it is evinced by Department of Defense regulations-law, thereby
erasing a meaningless distinction.202 By codifying the DoD regulations, any
change would require congressional approval."0 3 The Coast Guard is
explicitly excluded from the proposal in both subsections (a) and (d) to leave
their current law enforcement responsibilities intact.
The criteria for exceptions creates a structure for considering what
exceptions to the PCA are proper. In subsection (b), the proposed basic
criteria for exceptions is an emergency of limited duration and a nonchronic
nature that is beyond the capabilities of civilian authorities.2 The purpose of
such criteria is to keep the military from getting drawn into a substantial,
long-term, and distracting role, such as involvement in drug interdiction
activities. The emergency requirement recognizes the importance of the
separation of military and civilian spheres by stating that anything less will
otherwise to execute the laws is guilty of a Class A misdemeanor. Nothing in this section shall be
construed to affect the law enforcement functions of the United States Coast Guard.
Id., cited in James P. O'Shaughnessy, Note, The Posse Comitatus Act: Reconstruction Politics
Reconsidered, 13 AM. CRIM. L. REv. 703,711 n.43 (1976).
200. See text accompanying supra note 12.
201. See supra notes 66-67 and accompanying text. The 94th Congress also considered similarly
broadening the coverage of the PCA. See supra note 201.
202. See supra note 68 and accompanying text.
203. A regulation that is not codified does not require congressional approval to be changed. Cf
supra note 68 (noting the withdrawal of a section similar to the DoD Regulations from the Code of
Federal Regulations presumably to make the regulations easier to change).
204. A similar proposal was made by Professor Christopher Pyle. See PCA Hearing, supra note
13, at 42.
What is at stake is nothing less than a consistent theory of the proper role of armed forces in a
democratic republic.
That theory... envisions the military as a back-up force, operating under its own command,
prepared to deal with large scale emergencies, beyond the capabilities of civilian authorities, not for
the purpose of executing civilian laws, or even assisting in their execution, but for restoring order,
saving lives, and protecting property from natural or man-made disasters.
Id. (emphasis added) (statement Christopher H. Pyle, Professor, Mount Holyoke College).
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not involve the military. An emergency also suggests something more than an
ordinary occurrence, which further ties in the notion of a nonchronic problem
requiring a limited time commitment. The military should be used as a stop-
gap, not as a permanent or regular solution to a problem.0 5 Requiring the
problem to be beyond the capabilities of civilian authorities forces the
military to stay out of matters that can otherwise be handled by the proper
authorities2° and will encourage the development of those authorities'
capabilities to deal with chronic, nonemergency problems.
The framework of this proposal would allow exceptions for civil
disturbances, insurrection, strike replacement, and disaster relief, because all
are limited in scope, require resources usually beyond local authorities, and
would by nature be emergencies. The use of troops for border duty would fail
under all three requirements because no emergency is occurring, involvement
is not of limited duration, and customs and immigration problems are not
beyond the capabilities of immigration authorities. The counter-drug
exception also fails under all three criteria, particularly because it involves no
emergency and is not of limited duration. The investigative support exception
for weapons of mass destruction fails under the limited-duration and
capabilities-of-civilian authorities criteria, but like the PCA, the proposal does
not prohibit investigatory support.
The requirement of regulations to clarify the law lessens the need for
exceptions-in-name while providing military commanders with guidance.
One of the reasons Congress passed the counter-drug exception was that the
military commanders lacked guidance. The inclusion of clarifying regulations
in the Code of Federal Regulations delineates the acceptable uses of the
military and promotes public discourse about the appropriateness of these
uses.
VI. CONCLUSION
The Departments of Justice and Defense got it right as recently as 1979:
The [PCA] expresses one of the clearest political traditions in Anglo-
American history: that using military power to enforce the civilian law
is harmful to both civilian and military interests. The authors of the
205. See McGee, supra note 3, at A30.
206. See PCA Hearing, supra note 13, at 16 (testimony of William H. Taft, Gen. Counsel, U.S.
Dep't of Defense) (quoting an Aug. 6, 1979 report on the PCA by the Departments of Justice and
Defense).
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[PCA] drew upon a melancholy history of military rule for evidence
that even the best intentioned use of the Armed Forces to govern the
civil population may lead to unfortunate consequences. They knew,
moreover, that military involvement in civilian affairs consumed
resources needed for national defense and drew the Armed Forces into
political and legal quarrels that could only harm their ability to defend
the country. Accordingly, they intended that the Armed Forces be used
in law enforcement only in those serious cases to which the ordinary
processes of civilian law were incapable of responding." 7
The need to fight "the war" on drugs, to combat terrorism, and to deter
illegal immigration are long-term problems that are currently high on the
public agenda and will not go away without long-term solutions. Tight
budgets and the desire for a quick-fix do not create an emergency justifying
the conversion of martial rhetoric to reality. Relegating these problems to a
military solution poses dangers to our individual rights and to the history and
underlying structure of the United States that should not be ignored.
Resources must be made available to create viable civilian law
enforcement responses to these problems. If these resources must be
redirected from the military, then Congress should do so. Declare "war," but
let it be fought by civilian law enforcement with the right weapons for the
job. The military should be the last resort, not the first solution. In the long
run, the "war" will be more effectively fought with dedicated "soldiers" with
an undivided focus.20 '
Matthew Carlton Hammond
207. Id.
208. This Note does not suggest that the armed forces are any less dedicated, but these domestic
problems are not, and should not be, their primary mission. When the need arises, the armed forces
must be able to direct their resources towards their primary mission; thus, they cannot give these
domestic problems the full attention that they need.
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